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THE INVESTIGATORY STOP OF
MOTOR VEHICLES IN NEW MEXICO

r

'MISTER, "THE 5UPREME COURT 5Ay5 IF YOU DZIVE WITH
A BURNT-OUT TAIL LIGHT, YOU 3ELONG TO US. 1' *
Article I, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and
*Copyright (c) 1974 Chicago Sun-Times, reproduced by courtesy of Wil-Jo Associates,
Inc., and Bill Mauldin.
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effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to
search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without
describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be
seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation.'

Although this section appears to delineate an absolute requirement

for warrants in incidents involving searches and seizures, New Mexico
courts as well as courts throughout the nation have recognized that
certain situations present "exigent" circumstances which make it impracticable for law enforcement agencies to obtain warrants. 2 With
or without warrants police officers must have probable cause to
execute searches and seizures.'
1. This section carefully echoes rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... "
2. State v. Lucero, 70 N.M. 268, 372 P.2d 837 (1962); State v. Torres, 81 N.M. 521, 469
P.2d 166 (Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied, May 6, 1970. For cases discussing the nature of the
exigent search though not finding it in the specific instance, see State v. Ledbetter, 88 N.M.
344, 540 P.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1975); State v. Gorsuch, 87 N.M. 135, 529 P.2d 1256 (Ct.
App. 1974).
3. New Mexico courts have carved out four other major exceptions to the warrant
requirement with respect to automobiles. These include consent, plain view, search incident
to arrest and inventory search.
A voluntary consent can authorize a warrantless search. State v. Aull, 78 N.M. 607, 435
P.2d 437 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 927 (1968), articulated the standard used to
evaluate the voluntariness of consent to an automobile search: "IT] he consent to the search
must be freely and intelligently given, must be voluntary and not the product of durress or
coercion, actual or implied and must be proved by clear and positive evidence with the
burden of proof on the state." Id. at 613, 435 P.2d at 443. See also State v. Bloom, 90 N.M.
192, 561 P.2d 465 (1977); State v. Bidegain, 88 N.M. 466, 541 P.2d 971 (1975); State v.
Herring, 77 N.M. 232, 421 P.2d 767 (1966); State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858
(1966); State v. Carlton, 83 N.M. 644, 495 P.2d 1091 (Ct. App. 1972).
The doctrine of plain view permits inadvertent seizure of contraband in plain view of an
officer from a place where he/she had a right to be. State v. Anaya, 82 N.M. 531, 484 P.2d
373 (Ct. App. 1971); State v. Miller, 80 N.M. 227, 453 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1969).
When an arrest takes place, police have a right, without a search warrant, to make a
contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or
implements used to commit the crime. This right to search extends to areas under the
accused's immediate control, including those portions of a vehcile from which weapons and
other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, or destroy
evidence might be obtained. State v. Reyes, 81 N.M. 404, 467 P.2d 730 (1970); State v.
Everitt, 80 N.M. 41, 450 P.2d 927 (Ct. App. 1969); State v. Perez, 79 N.M. 417, 444 P.2d
602 (Ct. App. 1968); State v. Sedillo, 79 N.M. 289, 442 P.2d 601 (Ct. App. 1968). See also
State v. Vallejos, 89 N.M. 23, 546 P.2d 871 (Ct. App. 1976); State v. Gurule, 84 N.M. 142,
500 P.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1972); State v. Courtright, 83 N.M. 474, 493 P.2d 959 (Ct. App.
1972); Salazar v. State, 82 N.M. 630, 485 P.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1971).
New Mexico has recognized that a routine inventory of an impounded vehicle in the
lawful custody of the police, made without a warrant in the standard course of police
procedure and incident to a caretaking function, is not a violation of the fourth amendment.
State v. Clark, 89 N.M. 695, 556 P.2d 851 (Ct. App. 1976); State v. Vigil, 86 N.M. 388, 524
P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); State v. Nemrod, 85 N.M.
118, 509 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 372,524 P.2d 988 (1974).
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Probable cause to search requires reasonable grounds to believe (1)
that the items sought are connected with criminal activity and (2)
that the items will be found in the place to be searched.4 In many
cases where a warrantless search has taken place, the search involved
a vehicle believed to contain contraband. The theory often used to
justify such an intrusion is that the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the jurisdiction and may never be found again if there is a delay in
obtaining a warrant.' Yet a probable cause determination by an
officer in the field is not the sole basis upon which motor vehicles are
detained and searched without a warrant. In certain circumstances
police officers may investigate possible criminal behavior although
there is no probable cause to make an arrest or to search.' Investigatory stops of automobiles have been accepted by the United States
Supreme Court provided the officer is able to articulate a reasonable
suspicion that the law had been or was being violated. 7 Once the
driver has been "pulled over," the investigating officer, upon close
observation of the vehicle, may gain the probable cause required to
conduct a more thorough search, thereby permitting a greater intrusion into the vehicle he/she had stopped for investigatory purposes.
The existence of probable cause in an emergency or exigent situation is a major exception to the warrant requirement set forth in
article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution and the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution. Similarly, the investigatory stop, although technically not used to initiate a search, constitutes a "temporary seizure" of the person and his vehicle and also
4. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The Court in Carroll indicated that a
search of a vehicle without a warrant is permissible if the officer undertaking the search has
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains things properly subject to seizure, socalled contraband. Note that a showing of probable cause to search requires a different set
of facts and does not necessarily constitute probable cause to arrest which requires an
indication that a crime has been or is being committed by the persons to be arrested.
5. The Court in Carrollstated:
[T] he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the
Fourth Amendment has been construed practically since the beginning of the
government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store,
dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant
may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for
contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
Id. at 153.
6. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Frazier, 88 N.M. 103, 537 P.2d 711 (Ct.
App. 1975); State v. Hilliard, 81 N.M. 407, 467 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1970).
7. In United Statesv. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the Court stated that a vehicle
could be stopped to enable law enforcement officials to question the occupants about their
citizenship if the officer is aware of specific articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts, to warrant a reasonable suspicion that the car contains aliens who
may be illegally in the country.
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is an exception to the warrant requirement in this sense. Law enforcement officers are carefully trained to recognize the characteristics of criminal activity in order to be able to contain it as soon
as possible. However, without the imposition of certain safeguards
these officers can knowingly or unknowingly violate constitutionally
protected rights. For the most part the cases have favored objective
tests, or reasonable man tests, to determine whether probable cause
to initiate a search or sufficient grounds to investigate a vehicle
exists. Over the past sixteen years, beginning in 1962 with State v.
Lucero,8 over thirty New Mexico appellate court decisions have been
rendered in this area. The majority of these decisions are concerned
with either the reasonableness of an investigation or the sufficiency
of probable cause to conduct a warrantless search in a so-called
exigent or demanding circumstance. This note will discuss the current status in New Mexico of warrantless automobile searches and
detentions conducted pursuant to an investigatory stop.
Justification to stop and investigate was a primary issue in the
recent case of State v. Ruud.9 There the defendant, Kathleen Ruud,
had been detained by Officer Walsmith of the New Mexico State
Police after the officer observed a "relatively young female, driving a
fairly new pickup with a camper shell and an Iowa license plate."' 0
The officer wanted to check her driver's license and registration to
see if the vehicle were stolen. The court noted:
When asked why he thought the vehicle might be stolen Walsmith
stated: ". . .

[t] he driver just looked young to me, that's the only

thing that I can tell you." He did not think defendant was too young
to have a driver's license. The stop was made on a "hunch." Walsmith testified when they go out looking for a "load" (marijuana)
they set up a roadblock then use the driver's license and registration

to look for everything and that a young driver in a pickup with a
camper, with an out-of-state vehicle license plate, would be a good
indication that this "might be a good vehicle to search."' 1
The court was not impressed: "The state attempts to justify the
stop on the foregoing recited facts. We cannot." Walsmith was relying on a "hunch" or "intuition."' 2 Objection to Officer Walsmith's
basis for the search was specifically predicated upon the standard set
out in State v. Galvan,"3 which found similar conduct by police to
be improper.
8. 70 N.M. 268, 372 P.2d 837 (1962).
9. 90 N.M. 647, 567 P.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, Aug. 2, 1977.
10. Id, at 648, 567 P.2d at 497.
11. Id. at 648-49, 567 P.2d at 497-98.
12. Id. at 649, 567 P.2d at 498.
13. 90 N.M. 129, 560 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1977).
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In Galvan two officers, while patrolling a country road at 2:00
a.m., observed a vehicle approximately two miles away turn off the
county road onto an unmarked dead-end road. One of the officers
upon cross examination revealed that the "turn-off" caused him "to
turn on my lights and go down after him." ' 4 He stated that he had
been suspicious prior to that activity due to "[ti he lateness of the
hour, the fact that I have been a policeman for eight years-just
intuition."' I In analyzing the basis for this investigatory stop, the
Galvan court found that though the existence of probable cause to
arrest is not a necessary prerequisite to justify investigation, investigation can take place only when there exists a reasonable suspicion
that the law has been or is being violated.' 6 But what is a reasonable
suspicion? The Galvan court defined it as an awareness by the officer
"of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from
those facts" which would "warrant the officer, as a person of reasonable caution to believe the action taken was appropriate."' ' In Ruud
the officer admitted that he was proceeding on a mere hunch, a
conspicuously inadequate assertion of suspicion as pointed out by
the court: "In Galvan we held that the officer must have articulable
facts available, when viewed by an objective standard, to warrant a
person of reasonable caution to believe the action taken is appropriate. Here there was no articulable reason to stop defendant for
the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior. Walsmith was
relying on 'hunch' or 'intuition.' "' 8
Prior to Ruud and Galvan the supreme court undertook examination of the investigatory stop practice in State v. Bidegain.' 9 That
case involved facts similar to those in Ruud, with the notable exception that the defendants were stopped at a State Police roadblock
and not arbitrarily pulled off from the highway. In reversing the
court of appeals 2 ° the New Mexico Supreme Court in Bidegain
found the stop to be permissible as "a routine check of driver's
licenses and vehicle registrations." 2 1 This was based on the fact that
the police were conducting roadblock detentions of all vehicular
traffic to check driver's licenses and vehicle registrations. New
Mexico police officers are empowered by statute to conduct such
14. Id. at 132, 560 P.2d at 553.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 131, 560 P.2d at 552.
17. Id.
18. 90 N.M. at 649, 567 P.2d at 498.
19. 88 N.M. 466, 541 P.2d 971 (1975).
20. State v. Bidegain, 88 N.M. 384, 540 P.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1975), rev'd, 88 N.M. 466,
541 P.2d 971 (1975).
21. 88 N.M. at 469, 541 P.2d at 974.
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checks. 2 2 In Ruud the state had argued that Officer Walsmith was
2
within the scope of this authority when he stopped Ms. Ruud. " The
Ruud court, however, held that "[w] hen the detention becomes an
excuse for some other purpose which would not be lawful, the
actions taken become unreasonable and fail to meet the constitutional requirement" '2 of reasonableness. In so holding the court of
appeals expressly invalidated all random and unsupportable stops for
registration and driver's license checks. 2 I The court did qualify its
action by excluding from its effect "those routine roadblocks set up
in good faith to check registration certificates and driver's licenses"
where all travelers are checked. 2 6 The court cited State v. Bidegain

as an example.
In State v. Bloom 2 7 the supreme court reinforced its decision in
2
Bidegain by once again reversing the court of appeals. 8 The Justices
in Bloom, however, premised their decision not on the propriety of
police action but rather upon the power of an appellate court to
review trial court findings.2 9 The supreme court in Bloom was not
convinced, as was the appellate court in the more recent decision of
State v. Ruud, that the circumstances of the investigatory stop were
conclusive in finding that the stop of the vehicle in question was a
mere subterfuge for carrying out an otherwise unreasonable search.
The court of appeals in Bloom had arrived at this conclusion by
reviewing the direct examination of New Mexico State Police Officer
Williams who was conducting the roadblock:
22. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-3-11 (Repl. 1972) provides: "[E) very such registration evidence or duplicates thereof certified by the division shall be exhibited upon demand of any
police officer." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-13-49 (Repl. 1972) provides:
Every licensee shall have his operator's or chauffeur's license in his immediate
possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall display the
same upon demand of a justice of the peace, a peace officer, or a field deputy
or inspector of the division. However, no person charged with violating this
section shall be convicted if he produces in court an operator's or chauffeur's
license theretofore issued to him and valid at the time of his arrest.
23. 90 N.M. at 649, 567 P.2d at 498.
24. Id.
25. Id at 650, 567 P.2d at 499.
26. Id. Such routine roadblocks have also been upheld by the United States
Supreme Court. In United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883, n. 8 (1975),
the Court recognized that: "(0] ur decision thus does not imply that state and local
enforcement agencies are without power to conduct such limited stops as are necessary to enforce laws regarding driver's licenses, vehicle registrations, truck weights
and similar matters."
27. 90 N.M. 192, 561 P.2d 465 (1977).
28. State v. Bloom, 90 N.M. 226, 561 P.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1976), rev'd 90 N.M.
192, 561 P.2d 465 (1977).
29. The supreme court stated: "Conflicts in evidence are to be resolved by the
The realities of the factual situation were for the trial court to
finder of the facts ....
determine and not for the Court of Appeals." 90 N.M. at 194, 561 P.2d at 467.
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Then why did you stop it (the car)...?
Because I figured he was hauling marijuana.
This is before you, before you even approached the car?
Yeah, . . . [After explaining that the officers were also looking
for stolen cars, the questioning continued].
Q. Okay what led you to believe that they might have been stolen?
A. By the way the people act, by the car they are driving. You take
a 'skroag' driving a Lincoln Continental, a ten thousand dollar
car and he don't even have shoes to put on, something wrong.
Q. A what? What did you callA. Hippie, skroag, whatever....
Q. So then the reason that you signaled to Mr. Mikorey [the codefendant] to stop at the roadblock is because you suspected he
was hauling dope?
A. Uh huh....
Q. What was it about the two people in the car?
A. They just looked like dope haulers.
Q. Okay what do dope haulers look like?
A. Just like that....
THE COURT: How would I know what to look for if I were
looking for a dope hauler, Mr. Williams?
THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honor, you would have to go
through the State Police School and be out on the highway and
know, you can tell these people. I mean you have to do it with
experience, you just, you couldn't just jump out there and say that
guy I think is hauling dope....
Q. Was it the clothes they were wearing, [their age, their length of
hair] ?
A. No. It was by the way they acted. Like I said I got my own way
of telling which you wouldn't have.
Q. Okay.
30
A. You know, I can't explain it to you. (Emphasis added.)

The officer's own admission that he was unable to articulate a

reason for the stop is perhaps the clearest violation of the current
reasonable suspicion test set out by State v. Galvan. 3' Clearly a
decision that the evidence as a matter of law did not support the trial
court finding that the officer acted reasonably was appropriate. Yet
the supreme court reversed the court of appeals for so holding. 3 2
Despite the strong position taken by the court of appeals in Ruud
and Galvan towards increasing scrutiny over police conduct in investigatory stops of automobiles, the Bloom and Bidegain cases may
30. 90 N.M. at 230-31, 561 P.2d at 929-30.
31. 90 N.M. 129, 560 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1977). See text accompanying note 17,
supra.
32. 90 N.M. at 195, 561 P.2d at 468.
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indicate that the New Mexico Supreme Court is becoming reticent to
curtail such police practices. As a result, the present status of the
investigatory stop remains unsettled.
CONCLUSION

Although the immediate future of investigatory stops seems linked
to the Galvan test, the courts may eventually begin to rely to a greater
extent than at present on the "field intuition" of the police officer in
detaining and searching citizens. This poses a challenge to the protection of constitutional rights because two conflicting concerns are
at stake. On the one hand, it has been argued that police are indeed
successful in identifying possible criminal activity in the "streets"
long before it becomes apparent to the average citizen. Such reasoning asks whether the temporary imposition placed upon a handful of
innocent persons is not perhaps outweighed by the interest in apprehending those trafficking in illegal drugs. On the other hand, such
police activity is objected to on the ground that an intrusion merely
based upon the whimsy of a state trooper is necessarily violative of
the United States Constitution, and if such offensive conduct is permitted to flourish it inevitably erodes not only fourth amendment
rights but all others as well. One legal scholar posed the challenge
thus:
If penal law is weak or ineffective, basic human interests are in
jeopardy. If it is harsh or arbitrary in its impact, it works a gross

injustice on those caught within its toils. The law that carries such
responsibilities should surely be as rational and just as law can be.
Nowhere in the entire legal field is more at stake for the community
or for the individual. 33

Could we possibly ask any less of our courts?
EDWARD J. APODACA

33. Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1098
(1952).

